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The wheel-like figure in the design above is an 
ancient sun symbol. It can signify any source of illu-
mination, for the simplest light contains potencies of 
the subtlest and highest. Below the sun is a stylized 
rendering of a certain bridge over an alpine gorge. 
For this publication the bridge represents the nexus 
between the sciences and the humanities. But it can 
also stand for efforts which man makes to reconcile 
the opposites that confront him. With any light that 
he can find, he seeks to fuse conflicting yet comple-
mentary forces for shaping the unruly or inert 
materials available to his creativity. 
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THE RESPONSIBLE EXERCISE OF 
CREATIVE POWER 
by 
CARL TON CULMSEE 
ONCE last summer we stood. near the snow-white cascade 
flowing over the world's largest concrete dam, Grand 
Coulee, which is twice as high as Niagara Falls. We were 
alone in the gallery with the shafts that link the turbines 
to the dynamos. The nearest shaft appeared to be a pillar 
strong enough to bear half the burdens of humanity. It 
seemed to stand still and serene. Examined more closely, it revealed itself 
as spinning with perfect smoothness. For all we could see, we were alone 
in the eleven miles of passages inside the dam and powerhouse, alone with 
a cosmic hum and the whirling of eighteen shafts, each capable of conveying 
160,000 horsepower. Those shafts, a classic colonnade of might spinning in 
a wide spotless emptiness, could have been regarded as symbols of a machine 
civilization which had rendered man obsolete. But this would have been 
a weak and mistaken view. There were technicians watching control panels 
night and day to keep the enormous mechanism running harmoniously, 
supplying rivers of electricity to factories and stores, farms and homes over 
a wide area. The shafts were pillars sustaining a huge and intricate economy. 
They were instruments of man's will under perfect human control. 
The Grand Coulee project symbolizes man's power to weave the ragged 
fibers, the sprawling vines of nature into a compact cable of great length 
and strength. Who can estimate the number of turbulent, undisciplined 
little and large forces thus knit together - wind-driven clouds freighted 
with moisture by the sun over Bering Sea; rivulets creeping out of glaciers, 
springs, and tarns in a dozen ranges, rivers awesome in flood., all gathered 
into Roosevelt Lake behind the dam, tamed to irrigate, illuminate, and 
empower an empire? The dam is proof of how trickles and freshets of human 
energy, mental, spiritual, physical, flowing out of philosophers, scientists, 
engineers, laborers of past and present, statesmen and secretaries and 
bureaucrats, have all united in a river of tremendous might; that river 
transmuted into a torrent of fire, and that torrent, in the firm grasp of men, 
channeled through thousands of arteries and capillaries to serve farmers, 
housewives, bankers, manufacturers, toilers of a wide region; and all this 
alchemy - majestic power out of chaos, divine fire out of roily, brawling 
waters - all this from the vision of men who, individually and unweaponed, 
could not stem a creek. 
In this essay I will make free with earth and sun, nature and human 
nature, geological history and evolutionary process, in ways that only a 
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great poet or seer should attempt; and alas, I have grounds for suspecting bl 
that I am neither. So this paper could be presumption exhibited on a 
scale by a small mind. But I hope for your indulgence as I beckon to 
shoulder the wise men and women, alive and dead, who have aided 
This essay may be no intellectual Grand Coulee project capable of .",., .. u ........ 
millions of candles. But brooks and rivers of mental force available to 
have been as numerous as the physical streams which flow into Koose:veJ,tI 
Lake; and if I generate only enough horsepower to turn a scissor-grinder 
do have some gems of clippings, at least), the fault is mine, not that of 
shadowy legion who strove to help me as I wrote. 
• • • 
You shall wait no longer to learn of an assumption 
undergirds my effort. It is this: the two cultures 
divide our world, the scientific and the humanistic, 
again ,become cooperative as they often were until 
times, if we are to benefit from anything approaching 
full and direct expression of our creative potential. 
Charles P. Snow, I believe that this reunion is necessary, perhaps for 
petuation of our species. 
Another assumption of mine is more speculative. It is that long ago . 
something like a void, there were TWO. Two what? Two powers, let 
say: one a restless energy, the other an urge to impose shape on things, 
compulsion to bring order out of disorder. The Two, unruly energy 
the imperious drive to give form, were complementary; wedded in 
ofttimes fretful union, they constituted the Creative Power. Despite 
sional irascibility toward each other, they were essential to each other, 
concavity and convexity are compatibly contrasted in a water pipe, a 
glass, a chalice. 
That void where the Two fused should not be visualized as <;LUIJUIU<;;o,. 
with the Creative Power emerging from nothing to snatch building lll~~lCJ(llU. 
out of thin air or no air at all. In one branch of Far Eastern thought, 
Void is not a vacuum but a condition of spiritual freedom. For our purp<>Sd. 
let us call the Void freedom to create. The scriptural phrase "without 
and void" suggests part of what I mean; materials were there, and in 
previous spheres of development they may have attained more or less 
plexity. But as far as the new synthesis was concerned, they were devoid 
form, they were chaos and raw material. Just as a stone may have ·nrr,,..,r_ 
crystalline and atomic structures, yet be only a building block to the 
tect of a new edifice, just as data ascertained by some lab assistant may 
raw material for a mind capable of synthesizing on a large scale; the 
and Yin or the Adam and Eve of the new creation found building 
in the void, particles or intensities or complexes of such units, perhaps 
evolved for a former purpose but raw material for the new forms now 
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19 brought to birth. And let us ,theorize further, that this union of the ener-
ge getic Dionysian experimentalist and the Apollonian enforcer of order, a 
ny merger which we can call the Creative Power, has given us all the diversity 
leo we see, not only of forms of crystals in minerals and snowstorms but other 
forms in viruses, bacteria, and more complex organisms, everything that 
swims and stalks, wriggles, and flies. 
We must, I believe, see this Creative Power manifested in everything, 
inanimate as well as animate, in stones, in animals, in men and societies. 
In the laboratory, it is the reconciliation of the imaginative with the prudent, 
the one raising questions, devising expedients, plunging into space with 
speculations, the other obdurately demanding verification. In literature, art 
and philosophy it is the fusion in a period or in a mind, or in successive 
periods, of the romantic and the classic, the one being luxuriant in imagina-
tion and freedom of inventiveness, with an energy so ebullient that it might 
boil up sometimes in frenzy, the other requiring order and form for balance 
and stability. 
I hope I have not unintentionally insinuated the idea of a parallel 
between the form-giver and science on the one hand, between energy and 
emotional excesses in the arts on the other. Both sciences and arts are actuated 
by the same creative principle, including the imaginative and experi-
mental merged with the need for discipline of thought and verification 
of theory. 
• • • 
WHY do we observe a division, often an antagonism, cer-
tainly a lack of satisfactory communication between the 
two cultures, the scientific-technical and the literary-artis-
tic? One reason usually mentioned is specialization, which 
causes practitioners in the two camps to speak distinct 
languages, with different vocabularies or different mean-
ings attached to the same words. But this difficulty, though real, is not 
fundamentally divisive; the same barrier separates some sciences from others, 
some arts from others. Rapport of a non-verbal but mutually helpful kind 
can be consummated between, say, a Chinese and an American, even when 
each knows litde of the other's tongue. If they are men of good will 
unwarped by ethnic or religious prejudice, they can communicate to some 
extent by signs, gestures, pictures, sometimes expressing meanings beyond 
~ords. A more important cleavage develops out of our lazy habit of over-
slmp~fication, which like other sorts of indolence is a prolific breeder, 
espeCIally of error. Emotionality usually abets over-simplification. A painter 
~nd a 1?hysicist, for example, can be neighbors, hiking and fishing together, 
eepe.rung mutual respect and communicating on some levels with ease, 
agre~l~g and disagreeing to about the same extent as two artists will, or two 
phYSICIStS. That is, they can do so until something inflames professional pride 
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and prejudice on one side, to strike sparks on both; then a barbed wire fo 
entanglement rises and the communication road breaks into a "field of te 
honor." Some humanists like and respect individual scientists; but the word m 
Science with a capital "s" arouses in them envy or defiance or the desire to is: 
reprove and amend, as though science were a homogeneous fraternity, or a ar 
church requiring its members to swear allegiance to the same articles of rf 
faith. This is a most unscientific illusion which many writers and 
nournish. I have found, however, that some scientists and engineers 
alize JUSt as fallaciously about humanists - and about themselves! 
Samuel S. Kistler, dean of the College of Engineering, University of 
not long ago published an article in the college magazine Utechnic (1962) 
reflecting a generalization which some members of each culture entertain: 
that "we" are bound together in brotherhood by common standards 
ideals and by perspicuity of thought and precision of language. Such ~LLLUII-'''' 
tions are silvered o'er with a brittle moon-magic which cannot endure 
scrutiny. Scientists and engineers tend, I have observed, to disagree as 
cultures themselves, and in each of these two the members divide 
factions. They can, provided they wish earnestly enough, meet on cOlnnlorll 
ground and communicate with precision if they confine themselves to .. LJI ............ 
areas and largely to mathematical symbols. Beyond that they can fall 
semantic bramble patches similar to those which lie between the arts 
the sciences. That the scientist is trained to convey only one infallibly 
meaning with his words, regardless of how far afield from his specialty 
roams, is another belief which has been expressed to me by scientists 
which will not bear analysis. It is akin to the illusion that the cold, 
passionate, logical reason implied by the scientific method fcHows a sClC· ~ntlSl 
(physical, biological, and now social) inevitably, even when he walks 
his own province into that of someone else. It is related to the illusion 
scientists cannot have illusions. 
Dean Kistler also deprecated the contempt which, he wrote, UUU'"'U"''"W 
direct at scientists and engineers. Recently Dr. J. Robert 
( 1961) likewise bemoaned the "contemptuous" attitude of "so many" 
the natural and mathematical sciences. This sensitiveness of some ~1t:lll"3 •• 
and engineers to the relatively few criticisms voiced against them by humant 
ists astonishes me. Scientists and engineers occupy well-nigh 
positions in popular respect, and their feeling of superiority waxes 
generation.. As Charles P. Snow (1959), whose education has been 
scientific, wrote, "the young scientists now feel that they are part of a 
on the rise while the other is in retreat. It is also, to be brutal, that 
young scientists know that with an indifferent degree, they'll get a cornt01rt. 
able job, while their contemporaries and counterparts in English or 
will be lucky to earn 60 percent as much. No young scientist of any 
would feel that he isn't wanted or tha:t his work is ridiculous ... " The 
implication of this statement by a man originally a scientist is that 
people in the humanities are often made to feel that they are unwanted 
that their work is ridiculous. As a dean of arts and sciences for 17 years, 
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found this attitude certainly not universal among scientists, engineers, and 
technicians, but much more prevalent than any scorn which the humanists 
might feel toward them. No reasonably well-furnished, well-balanced mind 
is, I believe, genuinely contemptuous of the natural and mathematical sciences 
and engineering today. As a matter of fact, the opposite is proved by the 
respect verging on subservience which many in art, literature, and social 
sciences express toward natural science in words or by endeavoring to adapt 
its successful methods to their uses and even to guide themselves by specu-
lative implications of its discoveries. Rather, if complaint is aimed at natural 
science by a humanist, it is the despairing wail uttered as the last wave of 
the scientific-technical-industrial culture rolls over him. Or it is the grumble 
of those who grace in captive chains the chariot wheels of conqueror Science 
- to the embarrassment, I must admit, of most scientists. I do not know 
what more Dean Kistler and Dr. Oppenheimer could ask than the trust 
and respect verging on adulation with which the natural and mathematical 
sciences, engineering, and technology are generally regarded . 
• • • 
ON THE other hand, as I noted, there are many evidences 
that persons in the sciences and engineering view much 
modern literature and art with distaste or frustration. What 
is more, I feel that they are frequently justified. The rea-
son may be this: most natural scientists, mathematicians, 
and engineers conduct themselves as though they believe 
fully in the worth of existence and of what they are doing. They reflect 
that profound faith in the goodness or improvability of life and the need 
of expressing the creative principle which runs through all nature and 
through humanity itself. They cannot understand the soul sickness or world 
weariness infecting much of the contemporary art, music, and literature most 
highly regarded by some pontifical critics. They find the pessimistic 
existentialist and his views about the absurdity of life the height of the 
absurd. They cannot understand the acclaim with which much "quality" 
writing and modern painting and sculpture is received in some quarters. 
They are usually dumbfounded at the isolation or alienation from society 
~nd. ~he universe felt by many existentialist writers and artists. They are 
JustIfrably puzzled at the immense effort, the millions of words and acres 
of canvas lavished to illustrate how useless human effort is and how mean-
ingless life is, at the multiplicity of creations which must surely have a 
depressing effect on the creative drive of readers or viewers. With faith in 
scientific methods, technical processes, and human energy to solve our prob-
l~ms, they cannot comprehend the gloomy preoccupation of some of our 
~lter~ virtuosos with, for example, that hardy perennial, innate, and 
InexplIcable evil. 
Innate evil, seen not as a mere component of life but as the dominant 
element, comes back ever and again to haunt us. Probably it reappears 
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more formidably now since twO world wars, since Auschwitz and Buchen-
wald, and the Sralinist massacres of Ukrainian farmers. Treatments of it 
yield evidence of the malady which afflicts many of our "serious" writers 
and proponents of the most discussed philosophy of our time. A recent 
voluminous exemplification of the theme that life is meaningless agony 
and mysterious evil, that the stream of creative energy flows to bad ends or 
loses itself in a wasteland, is Katherine Anne Porter's Ship of Fools (1962). 
The novel describes the sailing of a German liner from Veracruz, Mexico, 
with a diverse but predominately offensive or miserable list of passengers. 
The Vera, a second-rate ship, is an elaborate figure to illustrate a belief that 
this space vessel of ours is an undistinguished planet showing the effects 
batterings which occurred before we appeared on board. It has a t1v"np'htllr 
arbitrary captain who lords it like a god and judge over the human 
entrusted to him. Everyone, repeat, everyone is lonely, heartsick, 
frustrated, or inexplicably bad. The malignity is incarnate most 
in a troupe of Spanish dancers who are gifted, magnetic, irr,·nr,..,,,i 
vital, and thoroughly evil. This malign spirit is not relieved by any I-'L"u..u~"II 
of hegelian alternation, evil out of good, good out of evil. The women 
prostitutes, the men pimps, the children imps without a redeeming tenLdellCY .• 
They not only pervert the reproductive impulses but would turn ~ ... ,.,,~.u,,' ... 
into murder for money. Because hundreds of people, who are pitted "5'UU3'. 
each other by bitter religious, nationalistic, and other prejudices, are 
into artificial intimacy (in a simulation of the future effects of our I-'VIJlll"" 
tion explosion), damage of many kinds is done to human dignity and 
bilities. The gentle Professor Hutten who from his ivory tower of LVl .... ll .. ". 
philosophy had viewed human nature as naturally good, has so many 
dences of perversity and malice, gratuitous, unprovoked, injurious ... lM..LUo;,'II 
forced upon him that he is ultimately compelled to conclude, "There is 
a thing as incurable love of evil." Dr. Schumann, ship's physician, 
intelligence and high character make him the most admirable of those 
the Vera, comes also to his hour of truth: "His agitation grew as he 
the oppression of the increasing millions of subhuman beings, the u,,·.uu .... ~, .. 
grave-stuff not even fit to be good servants, yet whose mere mass and 
of negative evil threatened to rule the world." When the dingy 
makes port in the symbolic doldrums of a world-wide shipping strike, 
passengers and crew flee the vessel without a friendship formed, with 
relief and hopes of happiness which are illusory. For the future they 
is Hitler's Germany with its frenzy of hatreds falling to the slaughter 
and the wholesale tragedy of war. 
What I would underscore is the disease which afflicts many of 
potentially best artists and writers, virtuosos of technique, to the Uo.JL"'f""'~. 
ing of our creative ardor. There is no doubt that most of our highly 
painters and writers expose symptoms of grave illness of mind and 
which must tend to poison or misdirect the creative impulse in them 
those influenced by them. Recently in Saturday Review David Boroff (1962 
accurately characterized the contemporary literary mind as being 
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upon nihilism and disorder. Using novels of Isaac Bashevic Singer for 
illustration, he declared that the novelist's preoccupation with "the demonic, 
the nocturnal, the rampageously evil" was the quality which "endeared him 
to the contemporary literary mind." The marks of most "serious" or "qual-
ity" fiction today are futilitarianism and meaninglessness, with accent on a 
ghasdy absurdity rather than on the wonder of life. The chief hope one 
can find in some of the most artistic works of our modern "moralists" -
esoteric critics seem to equate abhorrence of human nature with moral 
purpose - is seen in the effort to grope into a new mythos, a sort of "return 
to religion" in rejection of materialism and the mechanistic determinism 
long characteristic of the English and American novd. But often this 
"return" is a decline toward diabolism: in a new monotheism, the phoenix 
rising from the ashes of the old supernaturalism, God is malign and there-
fore requires the old morality to be turned inside out. At this juncture 
I comply with the informal commitment made in my original proposal 
to the Lecture Committee. I suggested that I deal with diabolism as a 
perverse expression of ·the religious impulse. All of us, I believe, seek 
harmony with the Supreme Power or the natural forces in the universe, 
to devdop oursdves individually or to improve society, to seek the ideal 
design of life. This may be a way to characterize the directive urge in the 
core of things. In polytheism, diabolism could be merely efforts to 
propitiate an evil spirit who is the black sheep in a household of gods. 
In our culture, however, diabolism tends to spring from a belief that the 
dominant power is inimical to man, or from a conviction that our tradi-
tional ideals conflict with the universal design. Diabolism becomes a religion 
of despair, because a person can scarcely visualize the supreme authority, 
whether a personal God or a code of natural laws, as hostile to him without 
undergOing a devastating spiritual upheaval. Actions impelled by diabolism 
are therefore expressions of the Creative Power, but expressions which are 
negative or destructive except as they unintentionally prepare for future 
building by wrecking and burning. In latter-day diabolism, evil becomes 
virtue and virtue evil; worship is conducted at a shrine where, in Swin-
burne's phrase, "a sin is a prayer." Sebastian, in Tennessee Williams' play, 
Suddenly Last Summer, had believed he had seen the "face of God" in the 
cloud of predatory birds that swoop down to disembowel millions of newly 
hatched turtles in useless slaughter. Sebastian had worshipped the demonic 
God, it is suggested, through degenerate rituals and finally had offered his 
body ~p as a sacrifice to teenage cannibals who had been steeped in a new 
paganism of moral inversion and hopelessness. 
Quite obviously much of the art and literature often ranked at the top 
of the scale today is not aimed at furthering man's evolutionary advance by 
Str~ngthening and directing his creative impulses. Too often the fiction 
:!1~er Or artist expects to be praised simply because he creates, not because 
e IS. ~ truly responsible or positive creator. Admittedly our generation of 
tran~ltJon finds it difficult to judge the ultimate value of revolutionary 
Wor s. But beyond giving credit for emotional intensity, sincerity and origi-
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nality in developing themes which have been treated little in the past, we can 
hardly find lasting value in such novels as James Baldwin's Another Country 
or believe that they foster the creative flow except perhaps negatively by 
exposing abuses and hastening reaction in books with more positive vitality 
in them. To be responsible in a large, wise way a writer or artist must be 
more than a channel of lyric despondency which disparages the tenacious 
continuity of the species and its constructive manifestations . 
• • • 
I HA VB told why I think science and engineering often 
trust the arts and as often fail to derive values which 
should gain from them, from products of older UWluallUM:l~. 
traditions if not from those of our time. Now I 
to descr1be deficiences of science which seem to 
creativity. I would mention reasons why humanists 
that science has blind spots which scarcely help qualify it for leadership 
all branches of thought. Probably therefore I shall place myself in the 
tion of one who in former times criticized a benevolent monarch; 
ruler, more in grief than anger, showed his displeasure sufficiently to 
loyal subjects to ostracize the ingrate. In more than one sense I shall reSemll>l~. 
one who in olden times had the foolhardiness to break a lance against 
dominant church. Nevertheless, at peril of clogging the 
channels which I would fain clear between you and me, I venture this 
ment: scientific man is still subject to human fallibility despite 
progress in certain directions, is indeed more subject to certain errors ""'-<111_ 
of confidence engendered by his long list of triumphs. Some scientists 'JeIICV._ 
themselves armored against human frailties by scientific ideals, the "'-"<OIlL,"". 
method, the canons of scientific objectivity and logic. Some believe 
when they rejected romantic illusion and religious superstition, they left 
hind all illusion and superstition, even the possibility of harboring old, 
generalizations and of erecting new illusions. They believe, to repeat a 
vious assertion, that accuracy and objectivity, immunity to fantasy 
passion, follow them automatically into any lane where they may 
no matter how foreign it may be to their specialty. 
I acknowledge the hazards I face at this point, more probably 
the lay mind than from the scientific, for science is widely revered as 
modern prophet, seer, and revelator, healer of mind and body for society 
well as the individual, actual or potential solver of world problems, and 
mate successor to outworn superstition-ridden creeds and baseless 
physics. I am not thinking of mere wild fancies which the ignorant 
entertain toward science. For example, in my youth I sa:w a lady pour 
coffee cup overfull but the skin tension permitted the liquid to mound 
slightly. Flushed with her little unexpected triumph, she uttered a 
disclaimer, "Oh, that isn't much - a scientist could make ,it stand up 
-10 -
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inch higher at least!" This prunltlve hero-worship of you contemporary 
witch doctors and miracle workers is a heady brew. How can you swallow 
it - and hold to your humility? However, I am thinking more of the 
scientist's own conception of himself. 
One can note, as I hinted earlier, an illusion which seems fairly com-
mon among younger scientists, at least in their relations with other groups. 
It is that scientists are a more or less homogeneous body of truth-seekers and 
that science is a reasonably continuous fabric of truth; not merely fact on 
a certain plane but truth in its fullness, a new plenary dispensation. This is, 
surely, what the best scientists aspire to but know that they have seldom 
attained. The word "truth" is often used loosely; we should distinguish be-
tween a verifiable datum and a rather comprehensive view of reality 
which has required the interpretation of many data, perhaps from several 
branches of science and even other subjects. When a scientist emerges from 
a stimulating AAAS session, particularly if he has read a successful paper, 
and he passes through an aisle of gaping laymen, he must have a proud 
feeling of the power and unity of his profession. But I scarcely need ask, 
what ,is that profession? And less need to answer; but I will: science includes 
hundreds of branches in various stages of evolution; it is a tapestry being 
woven in many fragments out of the most diverse human and natural mater-
ials. Indeed, while some weave, others are engaged in unravelling and shred-
ding parts of what has been woven. Thus far science's successes have been 
more in the stage of analysis than in the maturer stage of synthesis. Science 
is being made by men and women of many nations and tongues with mingled 
assistance, distortion, and pollution from powerful indiv,iduals, lay groups, 
governments. Recall, for example, Lysenkoism. Thus, despite conscientious 
efforts to protect its probity and accuracy, it is subject to human frailty and 
limitations. It aspires to super-human clarity of sight and objectivity; but 
even the "sophisticated" instruments with which we seek to extend its range 
and safeguard its reliability are human creations and ultimately depend upon 
a human observer with a point of view and with preoccupations which always 
exist in a mind. That very first step, the choice of III subject for investigation, 
is subjective; and the subjective enters all along the way. That is why Ein-
stein inserted a factor to represent the observer in some of his equations. 
To see science as a monolith of seamless and stainless steel requires an unques-
tioning faith of which only a starry-eyed innocent should be capable. 
. You and I know this to be true: there are scientists of vision toiling 
SIde by side with obtuse grubbers, inspired but erratic guessers - and ferrets 
of mere data, diligent men who produce much with modest expenditures -
and others who possess ratholes that engulf thousands of dollars with no visi-
ble result, men who rush into publication with meager findings - and others 
Who, after years of probing the bosom of nature, refuse to betray her secrets 
~ven thOUgh subjected to cruel and unusual pressures by research directors. 
b am often astonished, therefore, at the total achievement of you scientists; 
Ut on. the other hand I see the unevenness, gaps, contradictions, and fre-
quent lOability to interpret or synthesize results. We cannot blame science 
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for these apparent deficiencies, for science is young and the natural mate-
rials seem to be inexhaustible in possibilities and perplexities. But we cannot 
see science as unified by anything but earnest, honest aspiration, laudable 
efforts at self-discipline, and a humanity it shares with all others . 
• • • 
I HOPE I have not offended my friends by this harangue. 
I have deep respect for such men as Datus Hammond and 
Eldon Gardner, Stewart Williams and John Wood, both 
as scholars and as gendemen. I cannot name all the good 
scientists who have been understanding and helpful to 
despite my naivete' and incapacities. I admire such engi-
neers as Dean Peterson and Oayton Oark. With C. P. Snow I hold that 
the future is in the bones of such as these, and, I should add, in the 
of all those who swim sturdily in the profound tide of onward-moving 
and creativity. In my present mood I feel a special warmth toward s,tP,..,,, ..... 
and Oyde Hardy and Don Olsen for preserving a straight face 'WrIPnpVI'r. 
I mention my modest BS in geology to mask my feeling of inadequacy 
the presence of distinguished scientists. And it would be folly beyond 
rare gift for folly to suggest that I am not grateful for all the JU1UWlnu,,,' _ 
which science has given us, for all the wonders it has revealed, all the 
comfortable, saving, curing, constructive things it has made possible. 
aggregate accomplishment of the sciences, with their allies in 
and technology, has been one of indescribable variety and magnitude. 
out of a desire to conquer but simply to see clearly, penetrate natural 
teries, answer questions and solve problems, science has vanquished all 
It has rolled over the world with the irresistibility of a new deluge, as Ll"/U.~ 
a vast fissure had rent the cordilleras and emitted a flow of lava which 
covered the earth. 
This conquest is almost as marked in literature and philosophy as 
the popular mind. You can recall evidences. Emile Zola, the French 
influenced by biologist Claude Bernard, for example, formally surrender~ 
the novel to science in the latter 19th century. In his book The lix,oe1'vmem_ 
Novel he averred that henceforth novels would not be mere fictive art 
case histories exemplifying how inheritance and environment determine 
"The stones of the roadway and the brain of man are," he asserted, 
to the same rules." And a bit later an American novelist and critic, 
Dean Howells, proclaimed that the novel must be "veritistic," that is, must 
true to objective fact; and since life is dull, the novel must not be 
but dull, too. The philosophy of mechanistic determinism which seemed 
rise ineluctably from 19th century science influenced many in the arts. 
ers as different as Mark Twain and Theodore Dreiser wrote essays ~~, _ __ 
that men are simple machines driven by chemic compulsion. The de,hwlDaruz. 
don of some contemporary art, with man ridiculed or rigorously excluded, 
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probably, in part, a positive response to inhuman objectivity and, in part, a 
savage revulsion against the shattering impacts of the scientific-technological-
industrial civilization upon the spirtual and aesthetic sides of man. The 
dominant religion on both sides of the Iron Curtain is, I am convinced, the 
religion of physical humanitarianism, with science as its prophet. August 
Comte actually strove to make science itself the contemporary religion with 
solemn rituals and ceremonies. Thomas Paine and men both earlier and 
later declared that scientific research brought us the authentic revelations 
of God's will or nature's design; you may choose your own phrase. This creed 
may not include a personal God or anything supernatural in the way of a 
supreme being or of personal immortality. But it is an authentic religion 
or substitute therefore in being a quest for an ideal design of life, it looks 
forward to a heaven on earth rather than beyond the clouds, and it has in 
science prophets and seers of what is conceived to be universal law. 
Although the new physics and its indeterminacy have, I am informed, 
dealt blows to the image of deity which the Deists and some later thinkers 
formed, much of modern philosophy is deeply affected or ruled by natural 
science and speculations drawn from it. This is to some degree as it should 
be: philosophy must assimilate valid new knowledge. On the other hand, 
those who should lead in fitting together the fragments yielded by scientific 
specialties should not fall into subservience to those specialties, to become 
mere choreboys of empirical scientists, each of whom is intent upon his own 
slice of nature. One can, nevertheless, see many evidences that empirical pro-
cedures, recommended to us by their fruitfulness and their promise of mental 
security through laboratory verification, have extended their influence upon 
thought in areas which do not lend themselves to laboratory treatment. For 
example, a young man earning his PhD in philosophy wrote me that he 
could not seriously consider portions of a certain philosopher's work because 
they could not be verified empirically. Reading that, I was reminded of my 
first year here when I served as a member of the committee for a graduate 
student in agricultural economics. The student had, like many others in the 
social sciences, sought to give his research "respectability" by employing 
scientific and statistical devices. He had carried out his calculations of the 
v:u-ious factors studied to several decimal places. But when I asked in the 
fl~ oral why he had not included the analysis of a certain factor, he ex-
plamed thus: he and his advisers had decided that, since the factor did not 
lend itself to scientific analysis, being elusive and difficult or impossible to 
measure, they would exclude it from the study. I am troubled by exclusion 
of factors which are known to exist but are treated as though they did not. 
.. . The well-known logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach has declared that 
Philosophy is no longer the story of men who attempted in vain to 'say the 
~ya~le' in pictures or verbose constructions of pseudo-logical form . ... 
~re IS nothing unsayable to which it (the philosophy of science) must 
';£~tuate." These sentences appear in his book The Rise of a Scientific 
f b?:OPhy (1956). Meaning, in his view, depends wholly upon veri-
la ility, not upon a concept of knowledge transcending observable things 
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and employing other sources than sense perception. Now please do not 
misunderstand: I am not objecting to verification and any means of purifying 
the stream of fact. What is obvious, however, is that by demanding natural 
science laboratory criteria for verification, we necessarily exclude those 
aspects or factors which cannot be dealt with by such means. And we place 
philosophy and art in thorough subjection to the laboratory and its apparatus. 
If this is good, it is only partly good; the rest is falsehood and self-deception. 
In political science and international relations also the nuclear physicist 
and the physical chemist have, in the popular mind, the qualifications to be 
arbiters plenipotentiary, moral leaders, and philosophers. Linus Pauling and 
Edward Teller, on opposite sides, engaged frankly in campaigns which in-
volve more than scientific knowledge and theory and have a higher temper-
ature than the scientific method prescribes; they take up political, lega~ 
moral, and military cudgels. When Dr. Pauling appeared here he was engaged 
in a crusade under the banner of the Friends Church, and he employed 
the debating weapons of a passionate crusader. 
Leo Szilard, who is, I understand, as earnest and admirable a person as 
one could wish to meet, illustrates the manner in which the natural ~rl,pnl·l~r. 
feels compelled to assume center stage in world politics. You will recall 
Szilard as the physicist who drafted the memorandum which 
President Roosevelt that the atom bomb was a scientific feasibility. 
Dr. Szilard feels it his responsibility-possibly he feels an unwarranted 
of guilt-to lobby long and hard for adoption of certain peace policies. 
hopes to enlist at least ten percent of American voters in a campaign 
effectuate these policies. Note how the impressive collective achievement 
the natural sciences has persuaded him that leaders in those sciences posseSSll 
the secrets of success in that most exacting complex, involving all hrolnrhM. 
of learning, which is international relations. He declares modestly that 
is seeking "a market for wisdom." The political principles which are 
objects of his nationwide lobby he has already laid down in broad UUI'UU .... 
but they are to be formulated into a detailed program by a council of 
to twelve distinguished scientists which, he suggests, might be called 
Council for Abolishing War." In formal declarations to heads of ~V·.<;;'UU1"U'_ 
Dr. Pauling has undertaken to represent not only Science but the race 
man, when he protests against nuclear testing. Because no one can 
to the humane objects of peace and world salvation, he has a most UI~ial.I.lU<" 
manner of enlisting all mankind in one procession, placing himself at 
head and leading it down a street which is not named Science. In a 
modest man this would appear arrogant. It might even be termed me:giIJ". 
mania by the unsympathetic. But so far as I am aware, the yearning 
sumptions of such scientists as Szilard and Pauling have not been \-llllUC;U.!!, ,, 
or deemed ' over-weening by many persons of importance. I recall 
familiar facts not, i hope, in envy, but perhaps to illustrate human HUU""',. 
in top-flight minds. The wide acceptance of their non-science convictions 
laymen illustrates the faith which many have transferred from religion 
physical science. A temptation most difficult to resist in the one to 
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.t the crown of benevolent philosopher-king and save mankind from itself or 
g insidious enemies by superior wisdom, especially when "the public" demands 
II the coronation. It seems unscientific of Szilard, Teller, Pauling, et al. to 
e permit the incense of public adulation to cause this intoxication which often 
:e makes them respond authoritatively to questions of sociology, psychology, 
s. morals, abstract justice, international politics, military strategy, and occa-
1. sionally scientific specialties outside their own fields. It is both a sign of 
'it that last infirmity of noble minds, the ambition to play destiny on the world 
.e stage, and of the completeness of the conquest by natural science when the 
Id public takes scientists' answers to scientifically irrelevant queries, not as 
1- opinions of interested citizens, passionate amateurs, but as sagacities that 
r- are better than oracular utterances from Dodona 'because they must be 
l~ laboratory tested 99 and 44/100 percent pure. 
!d How does all this apply to the honest and full expression of the creative 
!d power? How can I find any fault with the creative achievements of natural 
science? What I mean to arrive at .is this: we pay for everything we receive, 
as and just as much in hidden as in open ways. The scientist gives his blood, 
sweat, and tears; the private foundations and the government agencies 
appropriate funds; the universities allot what they can; the military services 
participate wholeheartedly; the wives and children of many devoted scientists 
make sacrifices too for the welfare of all; 'We all pay taxes and give moral 
support. The productivity is therefore stupendous, and it is multiplying. And 
make no mistake about it : we must regard this abundance of new knowledge 
as great good fortune. One must be insatiable, therefore, to desire something 
more. 
But it is not more in volume that is sought; there appears to be a 
need for due measure, just proportion, or, better, another dimension of 
thought. Those avalanches of fact roaring down from a million mesas, that 
breaker of molten lava boiling out of the global fissure, have a horizontality 
of effect which we would do well to offset. We are, in other words, back 
to the theme of possible limitations of the philosophy of science. And we 
could not discuss a more important topic: national and world dominance 
projecting out from scientific to technological to social and economic organ-
ization and government, hence to every aspect of every individual's life, 
argues a monumental responsibility for science. JUSt as the mantle of world 
leadership fell unsought upon America's shoulders, the similarly unsought 
power of all-pervasive influence came to science. 
In short, we now look through the window of science upon all that 
Concerns man. Thus we see much in an intense light but we see it narrowly. 
A?d there is danger as well as benefit in this view. What if, for example, 
~Jen~e ta~es over philosophy with its left hand, absentmindedly, so to speak, 
.u~ In dOIng so requires of philosophy operations that are neither scien-~~ftCally nor philosophically sound? Then the scientist should be willing to 
Isten to the philosopher in hope of learning how to discharge his onerous 
World responsibility more ably. 
Some might question whether science, having established itself as an 
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unquestionable authority, is in a mood to listen. Introoucing this delicate 
topic, I choose an illustration which, being drawn from the early 19th century, 
is less likely to inflame anyone than a current issue would. Specifically, let 
us take the process of organic evolution. Thinkers of the Greek classic period 
had speculated about the theory. The early Christian fathers discussed the 
possibility without apparent spiritual discomfort. Much later Malthus 
theorized about something resembling the survival of the fittest in a well-
remembered essay. Darwin's grandfather and others touched the theory 
gingerly. But oddly, science, erecting a ceiling over its head, resisted efforts 
of some scientists and left it to other persons-inspired amateurs, we might 
call them-to usher in the era of belief in organic evolution. 
Loren Eiseley (1960) links facts of 19th century thought in a surprising 
association. In 1819, two score years before The Origin of SPecies appeared, 
the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, lecturing on philosophy, referred to a 
belief which "has become quite common even among Christian people, that 
the human race arose from a state of savagery and then gradually from a 
monkey came up through various states to be man." Coleridge discussed the 
way in which the intellectual climate may hamper or limit a scientist's mental 
explorations. He observed that "there appears to have existed a sort of secret 
and tacit compact among the learned, not to pass beyond a certain limit in 
speculative science. The privilege of free thought so highly extolled, has at 
no time been held valid in actual practice, except within this limit." Despite 
the growing body of evidence from paleontology and other subjects, despite 
the fact that for millennia plant and animal breeders had made th(!m!;el,res ~. 
agents of accelerated, directed evolution, botanists and biologists time 
again came up almost to the theory of biological evolution and then, 
Eiseley phrased it, shied away or circled around it. True, there were 
and religious pressures which reinforced this lid on their thought; but SCl1enc:CII 
organizations also exerted influences to prevent using the 
proofs to sustain a breakthrough into general scientific acceptance of 
idea. There was some pt:'rsecution of the pioneers by scientists as well 
by religionists. In the end, as I said, enthusiastic amateurs such 
Chambers and Charles Darwin himself paved the path to official 
of the belief. 
,. ,. ,. 
I handle this topic of trammels with diffidence because 
do not wish to be unjust. The ceilings to be discussed 
in large measure phenomena of transition, of 
Despite the condescension of past times which we 
when we speak of our "sophisticated" instruments, we 
not accommodated ourselves to the floods of new knoVl"-
edge, we have not integrated them into our traditions and ideals. They 
come too rapidly and they require constantly altering perspectives. As far 
facts are concerned, we suffer, not enjoy, an "economy of over-abundance. 
-16 -
s 
r 
s 
t 
g 
I, 
a 
.t 
a 
e 
11 
:t 
n 
It 
re 
We cannot, as a culture, assimilate any considerable part of the data that 
daily pour into our laps. We cannot pull them into anything like a coherent 
fabric, at least not one that has human meaning. Higher civilization is, there-
fore, a spiritual dyspeptic or mental patient. Here is one excuse for the sick 
art and literature I mentioned: the honest artist today inevitably reflects 
some of the fragmentation, emotional instability, anxiety of our time. This 
result might perhaps have been predicted for an age primarily engrossed 
with exploration and analysis rather than with the shape of large things to 
come. So why did I not let time take its course, since if we survive we should 
eventually mature OUt of these growing pains of the mind? Why didn't I 
choose that other, safer subject, Emergent Harmony? I might have done a 
neat bit of time-serving by serving up a delectable hope of Man Harmonious, 
man marching forward singing lustily, his chin up and his eyes alight with 
a vision of a future paradise of peace and plenty for all. 
But fate or some mischievous spirit has decreed that instead I must 
exasperate you with what may sound like carping aspersions upon the quality 
of contemporary thought, especially scientific thought. 
One ceiling that seems worth discussing is the finality with which most 
persons now regard our doom as individuals and as a species. It is true that 
some late 19th century popularizers of organic evolution attempted to see 
automatic progress implicit in the theory, and endeavored thus to reconcile 
their hearers to the belief. But science adduced too many evidences of the 
decline and extinction of species, substantiating a fear of the ultimate 
oblivion of man and finally the end of the earth itself. As Eiseley (1960) 
PUt it, "Since the first human eye saw a leaf in Devonian sandstone and a 
puzzled finger reached to touch it, sadness has lain over the heart of man." 
Probably the ferment over organic evolution in the 60's, 70's, and 80's was 
a more significant spiritual cataclysm than the Reformation. For millions a 
black curtain fell before man as person, as race. Archibald MacLeish's writings 
are representative. In one of his early sonnets he pictures mankind as gazing 
plaintively up to a heaven of "nothing, nothing, nothing at all." His late 
?Detic drama J. B. offers little more promise of relief from the darkness of 
mexplicable pain and ultimate oblivion, except for a flicker of inexplicable 
h~man love here on earth. Most persons who read Teilhard's master-
piece of evolutionary synthesis, The Phenomenon of Man, feel exhilarated 
until they reach the concluding chapters, which open a vista of spirimal 
progression beyond the extinction of the race. Then, with Sir Julian Huxley, 
who wrote an otherwise admiring introduction, many refuse to follow the 
~Uth?r. !nto a mystical optimism which seems to hold little relevance or 
redlblltty for this corporeal organization of cells, bones, and blood. Weare, 
most persons tend to believe in their bleaker moods, standing in a dead-end 
s~re~t staring at impenetrable walls, so far as hope of personal, spiritual con-
tinuity and meaning of existence are concerned. 
In fairness, one must admit that these philosophical implications of 
natural science do not seem to have impaired the predominantly optimistic, 
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positive attitude of scientists toward life. On the other hand, the effects of 
science's revelations upon general thought, especially upon current phil-
osophic thought, are certainly not all to the same purpose. 
The flatness of our matter-of-fact materialism and the sense of doom 
for the species are, for example, fraught with peril. Call it what you will, 
the Creative Power or a spontaneous religious impulse; but man cannot be 
emotionally and spiritually, not even intellectually, fulfilled in the cold 
impersonality and separation from personal involvement implied in scientific 
objectivity. (Parenthetically, we may ask: Is there truth in C. P. Snow's 
observation that a relatively high percentage of physical scientists have 
become inflamed by Communism as a faith requiring fervid dedication? 
an artificial atmosphere of chilly objectivity do they come to yearn for 
hot-blooded cause?) As Philip Wheelwright (1962) has recently <:U.lp.l .. ""'L.<:"'. 
the discrediting of myths which metaphorically embody profound, 
truths leads to a period of skepticism that is spiritually empty. Man is 
long content with such a vacuum. Our skepticism may well, because of 
absorption with natural science, be inevitable; but a violent reaction to 
may ~ equally inevitable. Man's impulses toward creative idealism, 
natural longing for belief, for a cause that melts the human granules and 
fuses them together, can build up and explode. The hazard is that the 
logical, "objective" world will suddenly ignite into fanaticism; not nec:ess,arl1. 
religious in the old meaning of the word but passionately intense in lli:1'.lVll~ 
pride, tribal loyalties, and the religious idealism which still survives, that 
physical humanitarianism. This is a lethal compound: it means a uvuv,. 
stimulus to the zealot who persists in every man despite the persuasion 
this is an age of clear-eyed, unemotional thought. And the fanaticism, 
the rebirth of the Chosen People doctrine in pseudo-scientific forms, is 
the worse when people imagine that they are not fanatical but are 1 __ .:_._ 
judicial, and severe only as a surgeon must ·be severe, because scientific 
and a humane future absolutely require the severity. In such substitutes 
religious intensity, not less ferocious because they rise unrecognized for 
they are, we face dangers of world-wide extent. We may even have pn ·~pn~ 
upon the prophesied era of inflammatory reaction in the Nazi ferocity 
the Jews, which was to have been wreaked upon other creeds and races 
Hider had won, and in the killing of Ukrainian millions for differing with 
politico-religious system. For, if Sartre was correct, Marxist materialism 
indeed a type of religion. Human sacrifice has, however, never been 
trated on such a scale in the histories of older religions. One wonders 
replacement of old-time religious persecution with modern 
fanaticism costumed in the motley of 19th century physical science and 
cal humanitarianism is an improvement. 
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)f ANOTHER danger which has come, not at the bidding of 
1- science but as a concomitant of the growth of our pre-
dominantly scientific-technological culture, is distrust of the 
m mind, at least in its more subtle powers. 
U, Did some of you stiffen as I said that: "Distrust of the 
)(! mind"? You may reply with reason, "But science does not 
ld distrUSt the mind - it seeks only to make the operation of reason orderly, 
'ic systematic, free of error, to keep its product sound and true." I agree, and I 
,'s hasten to assure you that I do not charge science with constructing that ceiling 
ve over our heads. The limitation, one of the large paradoxes of our era, is 
[n not blamable to any profession or group or philosophy. It is one of those 
a noxious weeds which grow in a fertile soil beside good plants. Two principal 
!d, currents, among others, may have nourished it. One was the justifiable sus-
picion or aversion with which most sober minds regarded the worst excesses 
of the romantic period which followed upon the 18th century Enlightenment. 
At their most questionable these extravagances are represented by that 
succession of writers from the Count de Sade, whose demonic works gave 
us the word sadism, down to the Italian poet D'Annunzio and later diabolists. 
Byron contributed something to the flow of diabolism. I mentioned him 
because I do not wish you to think that these excesses were products of a 
few pariahs of little or no influence. Oddly, there were few who warned 
the reading public against the satanists and many who viewed them as not 
only exciting but admirable literary personages, much as today the teenage 
music public assumes that if a young singer sells a million records or stars 
in a movie, he is a great artist and a great soul. Even among the more 
wholesome romanticists there was a copious outpouring of Gothic horrors, 
sentimental naturism, and downright anti-intellectualism. In the generations 
when these florid pyrotechnics filled the popular sky, the spread of 
pure science and of applied science for the burgeoning industrial revolution 
caused a thought movement which has been, in the main, most salutary and 
prodigiously productive. This was the phenomenal progress of laboratory 
science. One may theorize that scientists, who are generally self-selected 
for the advancement of knowledge and the furthering of human welfare, 
were reacting powerfully against emotional exorbitancies ranging from the 
diabolical current in literature to the ferocities of the French revolution. 
Th~y were seeing with increasing clarity the need for protecting the mind 
agaInst its tendencies toward unrestrained enthusiasm and hysteria, toward 
speculation based on little or nothing, toward all the mental faults we have 
grounds to fear in ourselves. They sought mental discipline in every way 
they could. The laboratory as it developed became a sanctuary for the quest 
of ~act and its verification. One should also add that the 19th century became 
a tlme of widespread religious disillusionment. Physical science with its 
con,cept of absolute rule by natural law and the dramatc exposition of bio-~OglC~ evolution persuaded millions that they had been betrayed by religious 
a1~luslons. let us not discuss the validity of this conviction; suffice to gener-
lle that a great many turned their backs indignantly upon what they had 
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believed religiously. All these factors - the raptures of sentimental pan-
theists, the spine-tingling novelties of the diabolists, the reaction against 
religious orthodoxies - made religion synonymous with superstition or 
falsehood for many, made the mind seem peculiarly susceptible to error 
through passion and prejudice, linked intuition with discredited mysticism, 
made imagination a pitfall, made the mind, in short, suspect. In such a time 
of disenchantment, we fell under an opposite enchantment: empiricism. 
Experimentation, with its necessary companion verification, and the swift 
development of improved apparatus, all the tangible and intangible para-
phernaliaassociated with the scientific method, unobtrusively transferred 
the emphasis from the mind to scientific method and instrument. To our 
list of words that made us contemptuous or uneasy we began to add "meta-
physics," "speculation," "deductive reasoning," "intuition," "imagination," 
and "the subjective." When I say with Erich Heller that we fell under the 
empiric spell, I do not mean to imply that empiricism was delusive in its 
proper place. But men who imagined that they could shift their human 
responsibility to laboratory methods and instruments, and could magically 
transfer the virtues of empiricism to other spheres - without a correspond-
ing transfer of the mental discipline demanded in empiricism - such 
men could be deluded. Carried to an extreme by some, the cult of objectivity 
placed stultifying limits upon the thought of the more timid or less imagi-
native researchers. It meant exclusion, so far as possible, of the UU"~J.l""L1V';,. 
intuitive, speculative aspects of the mind and inclusion of only those 
of objectivity which could be scrutinized in the laboratory. In other words, 
meant depreciation of the importance of the mind and increased o;LLlpU.~','. 
upon those aspects of tangible or material nature known to the 
of the time. Materialism became, as Levi (1959) phrased it, a lo;ll~"JU,I. 
"the subjectivity of those who are ashamed of their subjectivity." 
I suspeCt that questions such as these are leaping into your minds 
"What do you propose, a return to unbridled fancy, mysticism, baseless sO(~CU" 
lation unchecked by experimentation? Don't you recognize the dangers 
the subjective, and the security in laboratory verification?" You may 
that I am taking some devious path toward reconverting you to faith 
mysticism and the supernatural as embraced in other ages. I am not. 
one thing, I am saying that scientists may subscribe to a formal code 
process for public purposes; but in private they normally work as . 
individuals, brilliant, imaginative, fallible, erratic, but in the main 
by the best of motives to express their creativity. Einstein admonished us 
watch how theoretical physicists operate, not listen to what they say 
do, for the two modes do not correspond. Many of our better sCl'eOllll .... 
confess that they are puzzled at the way in which some of their most 
ing results come to them. Dr. Carroll King, who appeared here some 
ago as an American Chemical Society visiting scientist, told me, "Some 
my best results have come by lucky accidents which I can't account for." 
scientists admit that they alternate, as Poincare did, between wise oa~;sh· ren.e5II1 
and strenuous toil; between systematic research and the incubation of 
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pretations in the rather unpredictable but occasionally fecund unconscious. 
Why, then, if the more productive scientists use imagination .and possibly 
subtler faculties to warm the cold processes of experimentation, logic, induc-
tive reasoning, if they do not hesitate to speculate somewhat as did Greek 
metaphysicians of old; if they use all the levels and powers of the mind 
despite their protestations, why harass them with reproaches about a ceiling 
on their thought? One answer is this: shaming the use of certain properties 
of the mind can reduce their power. Dubious or fUrtive use is not free and 
full use. Also there is always the danger that young prospective scientists may 
take the restrictions seriously, and find themselves not only disciplined in 
thought but hamstrung. One deleterious effect of what might be termed the 
"lens-eye" view as contrasted with perception by the whole scientist, includ-
ing the unfettered use of the creative imagination, is this: of.ten the scientist 
comes to believe that there is a peculiar virtue in the narrow view, in an 
intense preoccupation with a segment arbitrarily cut from nature and set apart 
in the laboratory; and that there is a sanctity in not attempting to see beyond 
the data painstakingly gleaned and verified in this artificial situation. There 
is an almost religious faith that the products of these sharply cloven, zealously 
safeguarded segmental efforts wll somehow spring together by themselves to 
form a meaningful whole, or make a unity salutary for mankind. In "A 
Cabin in the Gearing," Robert Frost wrote of 
. . . the fond faith accumulated fact 
Will of itself take fire and light the world up. 
Learning has been a part of their religion. 
The narrow view is the height of respectability on a certain plane of research. 
But even verified data may be misleading when expanded from a restricted 
base into a comprehensive interpretation. 
A widely respected chemist of our faculty, Norman Bauer, who died 
not long ago, confided in me that he was haunted by this doubt: how much 
did he lose when he carved a slice out of nature and experimented with it in 
the laboratory? What was missing, how much of the situation was artificial, 
When he took it out of range of certain forces and influences in the natural 
COntext? What subtle but possibly decisive factor did he exclude from his 
scrupulously controlled experimentation? The fragment of reality thus found 
and proved-how significant was it in a more comprehensive view of reality? 
We must, it seems to me, return to a larger trUSt in the human mind if 
We are to go on more often to the next stage beyond laboratory analysis. We 
shall be much more likely to achieve that fusion of the fragments which 7e se~ lying about us in often futile abundance. We may assist minds to do 
for thIS age, with its unparalleled fruitfulness, what Darwin and Spencer did 
?r. a past generation, and do it better. Although we must not jettison objec-
tIVIty and any means of disciplining the turbulent mind, we cannot sacrifice ;ny of the mind's strength if we are to have the interpretations we need 
Or higher progress. 
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BUT SCIENCE has a broader responsibility. Since it is uni-
versally admired and trusted; since the most fruitful results 
are expected from it; since its methods are imitated, its 
ideals taken as patterns for practice in other activities; 
since it is in a genuine sense revered as the prophet and 
revelator of our time, it should strive to thrust up through 
a ceiling which exists only as a habit retained from an old illusion. The 
reference is to the relic of belief that only the solid has reality. The notion 
that only wood and stone, steel and cement, flesh and bone in their gross 
visible structures are real, has been shattered in the laboratory yet it sur-
vives as a mendacious but tyrannical ghost. Here again, a reaction ~,'UHj'l1C '" 
to that of the child who has just learned that Santa Claus does not exist 
still potent. Because we are wary of the possible resurgence of any sUlper'sti·-1 
tions and illusions, we reject anything that seems to smack of the "UfAoLUa.,-• • 
ural and hence also of the imponderable and the spiritual. But I 
proposing revival of theologies which you eschew. I am only 
recognition of facts which we feel ashamed to use, or do not adcn()wJled2ell11 
in our lives. May I risk offending your intelligence by citing some eXiunple4 1 
which are familiar? 
There is, first, the matter of morale. Between twO football teams 
are equally matched in certain obvious factors, the difference in the score 
a contest will be a result of chance and something we term morale for 
of ,better terminology. Morale is an important element in the release 
creative energy. It can make the difference betwen inertia and pr<XltlctJIl'j 
action. I am fond of thinking of Florence, Italy, when a dogmatic ec()nC)IllI. 
determinist (and there still are some left) argues with me. For a long 
Florence was not a great commercial city; nor was it a gold-producing 
therefore it could scarcely have been expected to become famous for 
att of the goldsmith or for commercial banking. But it became both. 
had no first-rate marble easily accessible; therefore it could hardly have 
expected to produce superlative marble statues in numbers. But it did. 
lacked virtually all the physical resources necessary for the fostering of 
plastic atts; yet this relatively small town became the art capital of 
Occident during the Renaissance. How was Florence able to triumph 
physical inadequacies and the twO human pitfalls, "the fear of existing 
the necessity of living"? After allowing something for the influences of 
and princes, we must, I think, see that some intangible source of the 
in the Florentine spirit made it wonderfully creative. 
Here is a different type of illustration. A speaker for a minority 
informed the congregation that each member of that sect was oUltnUllD!:Ie11 
4,000 to one in the world's population. One faint-heatted hearer 
himself pursued by a mob intent on clothing him in tar and feathers. 
the speaker went on to point out that this ratio afforded a glorious 
tunity for each member to become the leader of thousands. 
alchemy or corrosive acid. The difference between a productive 
and an unproductive one may well be that the first believes - a theory 
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lending itself to laboratory tests and measurements - that what he is doing 
is somehow worthwhile; and the other's energy may be vitiated by what 
existential philosophers term his "confrontation with nothingness." 
• • • 
To SUMMARIZE: the collective achievement of the natural 
and mathematical sciences is so splendid to help us under-
stand the universe and conquer nature that we must con-
stantly marvel at it thankfully. On the other hand, the 
overwhelming dominance of science produces some effects 
of a "one-party system," and a one-party system has marked 
deficiences. The one party comes to feel a rightness and a sureness which 
may not always be justified. The might of majority makes right, even over 
the wisdom of far-sighted minorities. Admittedly, science has both diversity 
and certain built-in safeguards which tend to protect it, and us the lay public. 
Its standards for the quest of 'truth on some levels are most admirable. 
Nevertheless, I feel, this power is not now balanced by other elements of 
adequate strength. We have, in plain, an imbalance, a disproportion, a 
lack of the due measure which sages have recognized as true wisdom. If 
anyone disagrees with me, and declares that 'there is not an imbalance, I 
must consider his disagreement as an evidence of what I have asserted : 
that an overwhelming power is likely to regard itself as all-sufficient and is 
not likely to regard opposing minorities or individuals as wise or whole-
some. They belong to the vanquished, the discredited. It need not be 
unduly sensitive to criticism or the imperatives of change. It finds itself, 
moreover, thrust into positions and duties for which it was not fashioned. 
To illustrate a danger of dominance, let me remind you of a most 
seductive situation which confronts the young scientist or engineer: Custom-
arily his education is more or less specialized, partly because professional 
curricula are designed to make him a specialist and partly because his pro-
fessional enthusiasm commonly makes him ignore or depreciate his oppor-
tunities to gain breadth. As many experts in the sciences and engineering 
h~ve pointed out, the aspirant in those subjects customarily feels impatient 
WIth anything but courses which directly advance him toward success in his 
specialty. When his subject rates high in the market, he can sell his services 
advantageously even if he himself may not be a bargain in a direct compari-
so~ of I. Q., research productivity, and femndity of resource with persons 
~ralned in other subjects. He receives customarily a higher salary, often carry-
~g .with it possibilities of supplementary income from consultation fees or 
Sl~ emoluments. He is made to feel that what he is doing is worthwhile, 
P~actlCal, more related to reality than the activities of the young person in 
t e humanities and the arts. By admiring laymen, over-awed by his apparent 
lllastery Over the mysteries of nature, he is invested with a measure of 
oracular infallibility which radiates ,beyond his own province. I am eager 
-23-
to pay all homage due science and technology; but uncritical adulation by 
the multitude can subtly undermine the humility which science seeks to culti-
\Tate, not as an abstract virtue but as an essential to clear thinking. 
Therefore it is reassuring - it should be reassuring to persons in both 
the sciences and the arts - to see numbers of scientists turning to philosophy, 
not for pat answers but for additional height of reach and breadth of syn-
thesis to be gained, we would hope, through intimate acquaintance with the 
best philosophic minds of past and present. We hope that few will, in 
effect, say, "Give me no metaphysical nonsense, no vaporous speculations 
planted firmly in midair. What I wish from you is, first, a course in logic 
and, second, a course in the philosophy of science fashioned upon the criteria 
of empiricism." This attitude degrades the philosopher to the status of a 
Greek slave serving a Roman master late returned from the conquest of 
barbarous tribes, serving not to free the higher faculties of the master's 
mind but to keep his accounts and help him rear his children as a glorified 
but submissive governess. 
No branch of knowledge can, in my opinion, at once strike down and 
swallow whole another branch of knowledge as our logical empiricist, quoted 
earlier, indicated that science had done to philosophy. Even if he did not 
mean precisely that, but meant that science no longer had need of traditional 
philosophy, having evolved a clarity of vision, certainly of result, and pre-
cision of expression beyond the powers of philosophy, he should not, I 
think, have chosen the phrases he used. For in effect they clamp bonds upon 
the outward and upward growth of science itself. The philosophy of science 
has, he indicated, leaped far ahead of the efforts of men who vainly strove 
"to say the unsayable in pictures or verbose constructions of pseudo-logical 
form. . . . There is nothing unsayable to which it must capitulate." I can-
not believe he meant that dogmatic expression as it sounds, for every 
creative scientist stands at the border of the unknown and hence the 
unsayable. How far does it extend? What new phenomena does it encom-
pass? How can he describe the elusive properties of it, when he is sure 
they exist but he is able to isolate and measure, according to his man-made 
symbols, only one or twO of them? What nomenclature will he adopt, when 
he knows that he is naming only a facet and not all of the potencies in the 
discovery? And here we come to an illustration of the fact that the SClenlt1st 
work is creative rather than simply revelatory: In a new area of discovery 
the scientist must construct, rather than merely uncover, ideas. 
intellectual constructions are based necessarily on the one-sided views 
the sharply delimited nature of his experimentation allows him. All 
he does not know but senses in dim, troubled prophecy remains 
except perhaps through the incandescence that shines through an 
metaphor to reveal glimpses of the infinitely complex reality which no 
made verbalization or man-made mathematical symbol can encompass. 
Scientists and engineers sometimes, as I have mentioned 
pride themselves upon a lucidity and precision of language which 
think a humanist might well learn from them. I grant that we in the 
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can be guilty of sloppy reasoning and expression. On the other hand, a tight, 
hard precision about those things still undetermined, about the mysteries 
still beyond us but dimly predicted in our laboratory strivings, especially 
about wonderful complexes which we can only partly visualize - and only 
clumsily represent in symbols - precision may be misleading or inaccurate. 
Please do not misunderstand - precision is, of course, a necessity in certain 
situations. But a succinct, precise definition is an intellectual construction; 
it is not the thing defined; it is a SOrt of diagrammatic or schematic presenta-
tion in the -best symbolic language that a particular observer is master of at 
the moment. It is a picture of the observer's view of that phenomenon: it is 
an idea about the thing. And from all I can learn of the staggering com-
plexity and potentiality in nature, it is always an incomplete idea of the 
thing. The rest remains unsaid and, for short or long, unsayable. If this is 
true of a highly specialized branch of natural science, how much more true 
must it be of that subject which seeks to integrate bodies of fact (incom-
plete ideas, mind you) drawn from several specialties and to distill from 
them some larger meanings? 
At every stage of our development we have, obviously, topped a new 
horizon. What has lain on the other side has required us to reorient our-
selves, to abandon or modify some generalizations and invent new ones. 
The discoveries and new syntheses demand new names or new content under 
an old label. To insist that nothing is unsayable sounds like sheer bravado. 
Worse, it suggests that we are satisfied with the precision and completeness 
of our current language and other symbol systems. Surely it is obvious 
that much of our linguistic and symbolic equipment has come down to us, 
firmly embedded in habit and print, from eras much less advanced scientifi-
cally and technically than ours. What did Madame Curie know of micro-
curies? Did Roentgen know that so many roentgens make a lethal dose of 
radiation? Surely, then, it seems obvious that, barring a global catastrophe 
of some fundamental sort, this age will some time seem primitive in verbal 
and other symbolic systems of expression. It is natural to view one's own 
time as the zenith of culture and to smile at the clumsy expedients and the 
~allucinations of yesteryear, as we laugh at the hats and coiffures and hem-
hnes of, say, the Depressing 20's and Depressed 30's. It is good that many 
scientists know and act better than that, especially because of the massive 
dominance of science, for such an assumption is naive and dangerous. As 
Ortega (1956) put it, "Obstinately to insist on carrying on within the same 
familiar horizon betrays weakness and a decline of vital energies." At any 
rat~ it 'betrays a lack of vision, and is contrary to the inner spirit of science, 
which is nothing if it does not inspire a constant and constantly broadening 
Cuest. Science means systematic adventuring into the unknown. Aldous Hux-
ey. (1962) defines science as "the reduction of the bewildering diversity of 
unique events to manageable uniformity within one of a number of symbol 
~YSt~ms': invented by man, and points out that scientific observation is always 
I a VieWing of things through the refracting medium of a symbol system ... " 
n practice we are always enriching our symbol systems, partly as we add new 
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facets and dimensions to old concepts and partly as we add new names, 
new units of measurement, new terms for new dimensions. Scientists know 
that our linguistic and symbolic apparatus is often unwieldy and inadequate; 
therefore it would be wrDng to suggest to philosophy that the correspondence 
between nature and our symbolic rendering of it is other than fragmentary 
and prDvisional, with some aspects left undesignated because we knDw little 
or nothing about them. It seems to me the scientist must be ambivalent: 
he must be precise as possible about what he sees through his own empiric 
keyhDle; but he must use his imagination, as the pDet and painter do, to 
see the cone 'Of meaning widening beyond his symbols, and fading into the 
unknown. In other words, unless he is merely gathering a few more data, 
adding a few stones at the causeway's end, he must see that his proper 
sphere of activity is this very unsayable, because fDrmless, area around and 
behind the symbol. This is only tD recognize that the symbol itself is 
ambivalent: it stands fDr the fragment of reality verified in the laboratory; 
but it also must prDvisionally stand fDr what we do not know about the 
object or phenomenon. If there are many scientists and technolDgists who, 
despite the truth of these assertions which their own practice proves, cling 
to the naive assumption that a symbol or a word has only one value, has 
the precision which is possible 'Only through ignDrance 'Of certain properties ( 
or of impinging phenomena, or arbitrary exclusion of these phenomena, let 
us hope they will relinquish the illusion . 
• • • 
AND may we also hope that science will go increasingly to 
poetry and art, not in condescensiDn or levity for mere 
relaxation or superficial embellishments upon the fringes 
of life, but for release, Dr penetration of that ceiling which 
our physical-technical-industrial culture has erected a cubit 
above the heads of most of us. We should go tD the poet, 
novelist, artist, musician - if these are worth going to at all - for aid in 
freeing the creative imaginatiDn; for a vision of the fact that reality existS 
on many planes, but is most helpful on the higher levels of human com-
plexity where it is not less powerful for being intangible and immeasurable 
We must recognize once again that great metaphor stands fDr insight beyond 
verbalization in our rough-hewn language which, for all its richness, it 
hampered by the barbarity of its origins and by the connotations which 
encrust it; insights which can be glimpses of the reality which eludes the 
empiricist in his laboratory. (I recommend Erich Heller for some of bit 
precise metaphors - with which he symbolizes some unfathDmable - and 
hence "unsayable" realities.) 
Perhaps we in the humanities and the arts cannot hope that maDf 
scientists, except possibly social scientists and psychologists, will seek die 
wealth we know to inhere in the best fruits of our activities, past asJ. 
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current, until we more often reflect a conviction of the worthwhileness of 
life. We too must recover our balance. The existential attitude appears, in 
my opinion, to place entirely too much emphasis upon self, so that mortality, 
the annihilation of self, appears to be the only problem worthy of man's 
attention; and the confrontation with nothingness, with non-being, becomes 
not a portal to freedom but too crushing a burden for the mind to bear. 
The emphasis must shift to acknowledgment of self as a link in the 
unbroken chain of process, of evolutionary unfoldment, and to acceptance 
of the obligation which the mind owes to process, to society, if you prefer, 
for those strengths which not only give it uniqueness and distinction but 
the power to act. 
The humanist can, therefore, go to the scientist and engineer to help 
restore his feeling of responsibility, based on a sense of the value of life, 
a sense of which he himself proves his possession in his solicitude for family 
and friends but which has often weakened in literature and art today. 
Both scientist and humanist could well seek the meaning that inheres 
in such a project as Grand Coulee or Boulder: for poet and novelist, musi-
cian and painter, the lesson is that they possess immense potencies of mind 
and spirit, a little because they are unique individuals and a great deal 
because each is a reservoir into which many streams pour power; each is 
indebted to society for the strength and richness of universal mind. It is 
through society or this universal mind, furthermore, that they find the chan-
nels to convey their contributions -to mankind. The scientist and engineer 
should endeavor to see in such a project the same lesson but also this: that 
the first reality in the great dam and power plant was the vision of the 
project in the minds of those initially responsible. That imaginative vision, 
intangible as it was, takes rank as of primary importance, not merely in 
chronology but as of the first order of reality. 
And now we arrive at the crux of the matter. If we do not find sig-
nificance in this, my paper falls into fragments and chaos. This if anything 
will bind the parts together into a useful synthesis. 
Critic and philosopher Sir Herbert Read (1960) modestly proposes this 
thesis in the form of a question: Is it possible that life acquires meaning 
only to the extent that man is creative? But he quotes with approval the 
forthright declaration of Owen Barfield (1928) , also an English critic and 
philosopher, to the effect that William Blake grasped the essential nature of 
meaning, "For all meaning flows from the creative principle . .. " 
Meeting on the ground of a common creativity, the scientific and 
humanistic cultures are not nearly so different as they often imagine them-
selves to be. They sometimes come together for mutual aid, and should do 
SO more frequently. A symbol of their possible harmonious union is the 
U. S. Science Pavilion which Minoru Yamasaki designed for the Seattle 
World Fair. The scientific exhibits occupy suitably arranged quarters, some in 
rectangular structures above ground, some in chambers below. But from a 
~ntral COurt rise airy arches to dominate the entire building in height and 
auty. These arches are not functional in a low sense; their function is a 
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high one, to lift the spirit. There is a Romanesque strength in the round-
ness of the arches, but the soaring height of the pillars and the angularity 
imparted by bracing members rising to a point at the top give suggestions 
of Gothic aspiration. These arches symbolize the eternal eagerness of the 
best minds, whether in science or the arts, to break through into areas 
unmapped, unexplored. The introduction which Richard Eames wrote for 
visitors to hear upon entering the Pavilion is relevant at this juncture: 
"With a special kind of curiosity and a sense of elegance the scientist 
uncovers hidden relationships. From these and others he builds intellectual 
constructions . . . 
"Science is essentially an artistic or philosophical enterprise, carried on 
for its own sake. In this it is more akin to play than work But it is a quite 
sophisticated play in which the scientist views nature as a system of inter-
locking puzzles. He assumes the puzzles have a solution, that they will be ( 
fair .. . His motivation: fascination with the puzzle itself. His method: a 
curious inter-play between experiment and idea. His pleasures are those 
of any artist. High on the list of prerequisites for being a scientist is a 
quality that defines the rich human being as much as it does the scientist: his 
ability and his desire to reach out with his mind and his imagination to some· 
thing outside himself." 
Thus Eames wisely fused the two cultures together in spirit. Down 
through the ages, the most sagacious and fruitful minds have always levied 
upon both cultures. Let us then cease to speak of them as twO, for they 
should be and properly are one. When we speak of the glories of one or 
the other, we are not magnifying science or art, but the wonder of the mind 
when it waxes strong upon the purest foods that the universe provides. 
And both cultures may profit from a clearer vision of this principle: that 
the real meaning of life lies not in some maxim of philosophy, or in a quo-
tation from sacred writings, or in a line of great poetry, or in a formula 
from science, but in the earnest and courageous exercise of the creative power. 
In the creative process, a miracle can occur. If I may repeat a figure, 
each person is a dam capable of impounding tributaries of power and 
wisdom from all the earth, from all ages. Some of us are only small, earth· 
fill dams, storing up hut giving little. All teachers transmit, as a dam stores 
water and gives it up to farmers during the thirsty months. Researchers-
the superior type - add something beyond the acquisition of data. And 
some teachers and researchers not only store and transmit but transmute: 
their spirit defies gravity; they turn the dull water, which by itself seeks 
only lower levels, into divine fire which aspires to the higher planes. This 
is what the responsible creator strives to do, it is what the capable and 
inspired creator achieves. To be an honest, able creator is to find, each day, 
more of life's meaning and to make it for the generations to come. 
Man's potency, or rather his command of potencies in the sphere of 
mind enveloping the physical earth, could be multiplied if we reunited the 
two cultures, the scientific and the humanistic. The responsible exercise of 
creativity requires that we strive to fuse these complementary resourCes. 
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This effort we must make with persistence and perspicacity if we are to enter 
fully into the next phase of evolution, that of a world society in which 
emergent harmony takes the place of "survival of the fiercest." It is prob-
ably through such exercise of the creative power that we find life's mean-
ing and the means of survival. 
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A basic objective of the Faculty Association of the Utah State University, 
in the words of its constitution, is 
To encourage intellectual growth and development of its members by 
sponsoring and arranging for the publication of two annual faculty 
lectures in the fields of (a) the biological and exact sciences, including 
engineering, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture in the Natural 
Sciences, and (b) the humanities and social sciences, including education 
and business administration, called the Annual Faculty Honor Lecture 
in the Humanities. 
The administration of the University is sympathetic with these aims 
and shares the cost of publishing and distributing these lectures. 
Lecturers are chosen by a standing committee of the Faculty Association. 
Among the factors considered by the committee in choosing lecturers are, 
in the words of the constitution: 
( 1) creative activity in the field of the proposed lecture; (2) publication 
of research through recognized channels in the fields of the proposed 
lecture; ( 3 ) outstanding teaching over an extended period of years; 
( 4) personal influence in developing the characters of students. 
Dean Culmsee was selected by the committee to deliver the Faculty 
Honor Lecture in the Humanities. On behalf of the members of the Asso-
ciation we are happy to present this paper: THE RESPONSIBLE EXER-
CISE OF CREATIVE POWER. 
COMMITIEE ON FACULTY HONOR LECTURE 
- 31-
OTHER LECTURES IN THE SERIES 
THE SOENTIST'S CONCEPT OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD 
by Willard Gardner 
IRRIGATION SCIENCE: THE FOUNDATION OF PERMANENT 
AGRICULTIJRE IN ARID REGIONS 
by Orson W. Israelsen 
NUTRITIONAL STA11JS OF SOME UTAH POPULATION GROUPS 
by Almeda Perry Brown 
RANGE LAND OF AMERICA AND SOME RESEARCH 
ON ITS MANAGEMENT 
by laurence A. Stoddart 
MIRID-BUG INJURY AS A FACTOR IN DECUNING 
ALFALFA-SEED YIELDS 
by Charles J. Sorenson 
THE FUTURE OF UTAH'S AGRICULTURE 
by W. Preston Thomas 
GEOLOGICAL STUDIES IN UTAH 
by J. Stewart Williams 
INSTI11JTION BUILDING IN UTAH 
by Joseph A. Geddes 
THE BUNT PROBLEM IN RELATION TO 
WINTER WHEAT BREEDING 
by Delmar C. Tingey 
THE DESERT SHAll BLOSSOM AS THE ROSE 
by D. Wynne Thorne 
THE TEACHING OF saENCE 
by Sherwin Maeser 
THE BEGINNINGS OF SETTLEMENT IN CACHE VALLEY 
by Joel Edward Ricks 
GENETICS OF CANCER AND OTHER ABNORMAL GROWTHS 
by Eldon J. Gardner 
- 32 -
( 
r 
OBllGATIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION TO THE SOCIAL ORDER 
by Ernest A. Jacobsen 
SOME EFFECTS OF FLUORIDES ON PLANTS, ANIMALS, AND MAN 
by Delbert A. Greenwood 
THE POllTICAL PROCESS 
by Milton R. Merrill 
RANGE llVESTOCK NUTRITION AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN REGION 
by C. Wayne Cook 
SOME ECONOMIC F ALLAOES AND THE CITIZEN 
by Evan B. Murray 
UTAH'S FUTURE WATER PROBLEMS 
by Wayne D. Criddle 
MOTIVATION IN LEARNING 
by Arden N. Frandsen 
(not published in this series) 
GOOD NUTRITION FOR THE FAMILY 
by Ethelwyn B. Wilcox 
ZION IN PARADISE: EARLY MORMONS IN THE SOUTH SEAS 
by S. George Ellsworth 
STUDIES IN EXPERIMENTAL EVOLUTION 
by William Sidney Boyle 
WATER FOR MAN 
by Sterling A. Taylor 
THE SEMANTICS OF STRESS AND PITCH IN ENGllSH 
by George A. Meyer 
THE PRICE OF PREJUDICE 
by Leonard J. Arrington 
BEAR LAKE AND ITS FUTURE 
by William F. Sigler 
- 33-


